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European Development Banks and the Political Cycle  
 
 
Abstract 
 
 This paper investigates whether the lending activity of European development 
banks is affected by opportunistic political behavior, by looking at the change in loans 
extended by these entities in election years. The empirical analysis leverages on a 
unique manually collected dataset that includes all the development banks 
headquartered in Europe, for the period 2002-2015. 
A comparison with the rest of the European banking system reveals that while the 
political view of development banks cannot be supported as a general rule, it finds 
empirical evidence in flawed democracies, where large development banks actually 
tend to increase their lending activity in election years. 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the lending activity of development 
banks headquartered in Europe is affected by political influences. The topic is of utmost 
relevance given the strategic role that contemporary development banks are playing in 
Europe, coupled with the ancestral fear that these public subjects may distort the 
allocation of resources.  
Development banks are “legal entities carrying out financial activities on a 
professional basis which are given a mandate by a member state or a member state’s 
entity at central, regional or local level, to carry out development or promotional 
activities” (European Commission, 2015b). While there is a general consensus on the 
role of development banks in mitigating market failures (De Olloqui et al., 2013; de 
Luna-Martinez and Vicente, 2012; Foray et al., 2012; Yeyati et al., 2004; Gutierrez et 
al., 2011), the issue traditionally raised is whether this positive contribution is more 
than offset by misallocation of resources and destruction of value due to political 
interference and inefficiencies.  
As a matter of fact, according to the so-called political view of government bank 
ownership, perverse effects due to political motivations may prevail on the desirable 
contribution of government ownership to promote socially valuable projects (Hart et 
al., 1997; Kornai, 1979; La Porta et al., 2002; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994, 1997). While 
state-owned, non-financial enterprises can be used by politicians to provide jobs and 
direct resources to friends and supporters, state-owned banks can be induced by the 
incumbent policymakers to finance favored enterprises (Sapienza, 2004; La Porta et al., 
2002) and, more generally, to increase their lending activity during election periods in 
order to seek and retain the favor of the voters (Dinc, 2005). 
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This may result in misallocation of funding motivated by two main hypotheses: the 
“soft-budget constraints hypothesis” and the “rent-seeking hypothesis.” The “soft-
budget constraints hypothesis” (Kornai, 1979; Lin and Tan, 1999) suggests that 
abundant and lenient capital from the state increase the likelihood that state-owned 
banks may approve bad investments and use public funds to bail out companies that 
would otherwise fail. Slightly differently, the “rent-seeking hypothesis” (Ades and Di 
Tella, 1997; Claessens et al. 2008) argues that funds are channeled to politically 
connected industrialists, who indeed receive substantially preferential treatment in 
terms of interest rates and access to credit even though they do not need subsidized 
capital. In both cases, firms will obtain capital for reasons other than the inherent 
financial potential of their own project, resulting in economically inefficient uses of 
public resources (Dinc, 2005; Micco et al., 2007; Lazzarini et al., 2015; Khwaja and 
Mian, 2005). It is just to prevent these negative side effects and the misallocation of 
resources that the European Commission itself underlines the need for development 
banks to adopt proper policies and best practices (European Commission, 2015b; 
European Parliament, 2016). 
Extant empirical literature has already analyzed the lending behavior of state-owned 
banks with the aim of assessing whether their activity is influenced by political 
considerations, with results that generally support the political view of government 
bank ownership. In particular, Sapienza (2004) finds that the lending behavior of state-
owned banks in Italy is affected by the electoral results of the party affiliated with the 
banks’ top executives. Khwaja and Mian (2005) observe that state-owned banks in 
Pakistan tend to lend more to firms with politically connected directors. Dinc (2005) 
empirically analyzes government-owned banks in 43 countries across the world and 
finds that the lending activity within developing countries is influenced by politics, 
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while this is not the case in developed economies. Similar results are shown in Micco 
et al. (2007), where the authors observe that state-owned banks located in developing 
countries increase loans during election years, while state-owned banks in developed 
countries do not.1  
However, all these studies focus on government-owned financial institutions, while 
development banks are rather a different type of financial institution (although they are 
also owned by the government (see Section 2.1)), with consequences in terms of 
political distortion that are largely unexplored as of yet. 
So far, the only empirical paper directly testing the political view on development 
banks is Lazzarini et al. (2015), who concentrate on the Brasilian Development Bank 
(BNDES) and analyze the performances of firms receiving its financial support. While 
confirming that political influences matter, they find that the BNDES does not appear 
to systematically channel funds to underperforming firms, although targets do not 
display any consequent beneficial effect in terms of performance and investment.  
 We adopt a distinctive perspective from Lazzarini et al. (2015), since we focus on 
European countries (including both developed countries and economies in transition) 
and we investigate how the lending activity of development banks changes around 
elections compared to other financial institutions. The empirical analysis leverages on 
a unique, manually collected dataset that includes all the development banks 
																																																								
1 There is also a larger body of empirical literature – beyond the scope of our paper - that analyzes the 
relationship between ownership, bank performance and financial development (among them: La Porta et 
al., 2002; Barth et al., 1999; Beck and Levine, 2002; Berger et al., 2005; Yeyati et al., 2007; Cornett et 
al., 2010; Chakravarty and Williams, 2006; Altunbas and Marques, 2008; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007; 
Iannotta et al., 2007).  
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headquartered in Europe. Financial information is benchmarked with a selected sample 
of more than 4,200 financial institutions for the period 2002-2015.  
Results show that the political view of development banks is not supported as a 
general rule. In particular, in full democracies no empirical evidence is found of 
opportunistic manipulation of development banks’ activity for electoral purposes. By 
contrast, there is evidence of politically motivated lending from development banks in 
European countries with weaker political institutions, in the form of increased lending 
in election years relative to the rest of the banking system.  
A battery of robustness tests confirms our results. The adoption of alternative 
measures for the main variables of our interest and the recourse to alternative 
econometric approaches produce very consistent findings. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the 
specificities of development banks and introduces the hypotheses. Section 3 describes 
our sample and the dataset. Section 4 defines the methodology. Section 5 discusses 
results and Section 6 presents a battery of robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2 The framework 
2.1 Development banks 
Development banks are public sector or government-invested legal entities with an 
explicit policy mandate to promote socio-economic goals in a region, sector or specific 
market segment (de Luna-Martinez and Vicente, 2012).2  
																																																								
2 In the Introduction, we used the more recent definition from the European Commission. Alternative 
definitions of development banks, also referred to as development financial institutions, state investment 
banks, promotional banks include: “institutions to promote and finance enterprise in the private sector” 
(Diamond, 1957); “government-sponsored financial institutions concerned primarily with the provision 
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Existing empirical literature typically considers all public financial institutions as 
though they belong to the same type. However, development banks have specific goals 
and market failures they set out to redress that deserve specific attention, and they are 
becoming increasingly important in light of their growing relevance in Europe. 
Development banks typically fund projects with high risk, which is usually the case 
of high-tech or new industries, start-up and R&D investments, by providing direct or 
indirect loans, credit guarantees and equity tools such as venture capital, private equity, 
seed capital financing or mezzanine financing to enable firms to access the capital 
necessary for growth (Musacchio et al., 2017; Mazzuccato and Penna, 2016; Bleda and 
Del Rio, 2013). They also provide long-term “patient” capital to promote strategic 
investments for economic development (e.g. infrastructure projects, export, housing, 
etc.) or for socially challenging projects (e.g. climate finance, renewable and 
environmental-friendly energy, food security initiatives) (Foray et al., 2012; Eslava and 
Freixas, 2016; De Olloqui, 2013; Yeyati et al., 2007). In addition, development banks 
play a counter-cyclical role in time of crises, by sustaining growth and employment 
during periods of recession, when banks typically disintermediate their credit activity 
because of deteriorating asset quality, capital shortages, deleveraging and higher risk 
aversion (Gutierrez et al., 2011; Yeyati et al., 2007; Luna-Martinez and Vicente, 2012).  
More recently, in the aftermath of the economic and financial global crisis, 
development banks have been called on by European policy makers to share the 
management of EU financial instruments and to play a primary role in restructuring the 
																																																								
of long-term capital to industry” (De Aghion, 1999); “financial institutions that are primarily concerned 
with offering long-term capital finance to projects that are deemed to generate positive externalities and 
hence would be underfinanced by private creditors” (Yeyati et al., 2004).  
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economy, channeling leveraged funds into the market, boosting innovation, supporting 
socio-economic and environmental challenges, and implementing financial instruments 
and programs set up to reverse the low level of investment by EU firms, in particular 
start-ups and SMEs (European Commission, 2014, 2015a; Mertens and Thiemann, 
2019; Clifton, Diaz-Fuente and Gomez, 2018). Accordingly, in recent years 
development banks have significantly increased their assets, co-financed a rising 
number of projects and investment platforms, fostered the growth of venture capital 
across Europe and enlarged the business volume in resource efficiency, digital 
infrastructure and innovation.3  
On the whole, development banks have specific industry- and firm-level targets, are 
involved in complex and large-scale projects and present clear differences in terms of 
business models and types of activity compared to other types of public financial 
institutions, such as state-owned commercial banks like Crédits municipaux in France, 
cajas de ahorros in Spain, Landesbanken and Sparkassen in Germany, cantonal banks 
in Switzerland and Regionalbanken “Hypo” in Austria. 
Indeed, state-owned commercial banks, like private commercial banks, are primarily 
involved in retail banking activities, such as bank accounts, payment services, insurance 
products and loans to households and enterprises, and their liabilities are mainly 
represented by retail deposits. By contrast, development banks are not allowed to 
directly take retail deposits and typically depend on market financing, budget transfers 
from the government and European programs. Historically, state-owned commercial 
banks have been established in the form of cooperative or saving banks with the mission 
																																																								
3 See Mertens and Thiemann, 2019; KfW et al., 2016; Bertoni and Tykvová, 2015; and annual reports 
from development banks such as the European Investment Bank, Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau KfW, 
Caisse des Depots et Consignations, Istituto de Credito Oficial, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti. 
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to supply retail banking services to the masses and to favor their financial inclusion 
both geographically (providing access to financial services in remote areas) and socially 
(providing basic banking services to all, regardless of their financial attractiveness). 
Nowadays most of them are joint-stock companies, because of changes in regulation 
and/or privatization, and, in some countries, they are no longer government-owned.  
So far, only a few papers acknowledge the extant differences between development 
banks and state-owned banks (Bacchiocchi et al., 2017; de Luna-Martinez and Vicente, 
2012; Lazzarini et al., 2015; Yeyati et al., 2004). Schmit et al. (2011) provide a rationale 
for a classification of state-owned banks based on an extensive analysis of the missions 
and roles of public financial institutions and clearly highlight differences between 
development banks and other public financial institutions. 
More generally, little is known about development banks, and apart from theoretical 
contributions discussing their growing importance and role in Europe, empirical studies 
on their firm-level characteristics and on the impact of their activity are scant and 
mainly focused on single multi-lateral institutions, such as the European Investment 
Bank (Clifton et al., 2014; Tuijnman, 2009; Griffith-Jones and Tyson, 2013). 
2.2 Our hypotheses 
The above-mentioned specificities of development banks may have consequences in 
terms of potential political distortion that are largely unexplored as of yet. Specifically, 
some factors may reduce the pressure of politics in the case of development banks and 
may serve to break the tight meshes that traditionally linked state-owned banks’ 
decisions to politics. 
For example, the investment cycle of a development bank is typically much longer 
compared to the electoral cycle. There is usually a long distance between the decision 
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of financing a project, its physical implementation and the consequent financial returns 
and economic and social benefits (World Bank, 2018). Therefore, the convenience to 
pursue political objectives through the lending activity of development banks is more 
indirect and blurred. Besides, development banks interventions are frequently targeted 
to a priori identified sectors, industries or geographical areas where the financing gap 
from the private sector is stronger (e.g. new infrastructures and societal challenges that 
need patient and risky capital; European Commission, 2015b), thus reducing political 
opportunities to misallocate resources. Finally, development banks also act as catalysts 
for private finance and means of mobilizing resources and skills and channeling them 
as investments in the private sector (European Commission, 2018; OECD, 2018). 
Again, such private co-financing reduces the possibility of politically motivated lending 
to non-viable projects that would not be co-financed by the private sector. 
According to this, if development banks operate within their mandate, there is no 
reason why their lending activity should differ from the lending activity of other (non-
development) banks just in electoral years (except for differences controlled for with 
other explanatory variables). Therefore, our baseline prediction is that the amount of 
loans supplied by development banks is not influenced by the electoral cycle: 
Hypothesis 1. The electoral cycle does not affect the lending activity of the 
development banks to a different extent than it does for the rest of the 
banking system. 
However, we are aware that at least in some countries, the degree of formal and 
informal influence exerted by the government may actually affect the activity of 
development banks. In fact, our analysis on the lending behavior of development banks 
during pre-election periods intersects the existing literature on political business cycles, 
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i.e. on political determinants of macroeconomic cycles (Nordhaus, 1975). According to 
the theory on political business cycles, an opportunistic incumbent policymaker may 
try to manipulate monetary and fiscal policies in order to induce economic expansions 
before the elections and, consequently, to influence the voting (and his/her probability 
of re-election) through economic performance. In this context, the review of Drazen 
(2000) reports clear evidence of pre-electoral increases in fiscal policy instruments, 
especially in developing countries.4 In particular, several studies suggest that 
opportunistic pre-electoral manipulation is more likely to materialize in countries with 
lower degrees of democracy, lower transparency and a weaker institutional set of 
checks and balances, since the power of the incumbent is less constrained (Schuknecht, 
1996; Gonzalez, 1999; Shi and Svensson, 2002).  
However, explicit fiscal rules and high debt burdens tend to restrict government 
spending and the possibility of manipulating fiscal policy to affect election outcomes. 
In this context, the credit supplied by development banks may offer an alternative tool 
to boost the economy or support specific borrowers (and projects) just before the next 
election. If development banks are not sufficiently free from outside control of the 
central government, their activity may be influenced and used by the executive power 
in order to help the re-election of the incumbent. Indeed, we may expect that in flawed 
democracies development banks do not fully operate within their mandates and support 
short-term political objectives of the incumbent policymaker. This would affect their 																																																								4	According to Drazen (2000), the existing literature on political business cycles reveals that explanations 
based on fiscal policy as a driving force of the political business cycle provide a more convincing story 
than explanations based on manipulation of the monetary policy. The latter are even less realistic when 
considering countries where central banks are sufficiently independent from the central government and 
the monetary policy is not under the direct control of the incumbent policymakers.	
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lending behavior especially in election years. 
Consequently, we want to test whether development banks may play a role in 
opportunistic pre-electoral manipulation in those countries characterized by weaker 
political institutions and lower constraints on the executive power. Following this logic, 
we formulate the following: 
Hypothesis 2. Development banks located in countries with flawed 
democracies are more likely to increase lending in election years relative to 
the rest of the banking system.	
 
3. The data  
3.1 Bank-level characteristics 
Our empirical analysis begins with an accurate taxonomy of development banks in 
Europe, since there is not a universally recognized and readily available scheme (or 
classification) for these financial intermediaries. We start the identification and 
mapping of European development banks by referring to the banks’ classification 
available within the Orbis Bank Focus database, produced by Bureau van Dijk (BvD). 
Specifically, the majority of European development banks are identified among those 
institutions classified as Specialized governmental credit institutions.5 
Secondly, other development banks are identified thanks to the available information 
on banks’ characteristics and their textual descriptions in Orbis Bank Focus. Lastly, we 
devoted considerable effort to refining the initial selection of European development 
																																																								
5 Multi-lateral governmental banks, such as the European Investment Bank, are excluded from our 
empirical analysis because of the questionable identification of electoral years at a supranational level. 
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banks through manual inspection, online research and a general review of annual 
reports and publicly available information.6 
After excluding three development banks that had no financial data available in 
Orbis Bank Focus, we finally identified 73 development banks, including national 
development banks (e.g. the German Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau KfW, the Italian 
Cassa Depositi e Prestiti CDP and the French Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations 
CDC), and smaller regional promotional banks (e.g. Hamburgische Investitions- und 
Foerderbank, Institut Catala de Finances, and Banca Mediocredito del Friuli Venezia 
Giulia Spa), located in 27 European countries. 
For the purposes of our study, the lending behavior of development banks is 
benchmarked with that of a selected sample of non-development banks headquartered 
in Europe. In particular, we exclude from our benchmark those banks with very specific 
specializations (e.g. central banks, Islamic banks, securities firms, micro-financing 
institutions, etc.). We also exclude banks from countries where no development banks 
have been detected. Finally, when the BvD database reports both consolidated and 
unconsolidated accounts, we use the consolidated ones. Accordingly, in order to avoid 
double counting, we exclude from the sample the subsidiaries of those parent 
companies whose accounts are consolidated.7 																																																								
6 In particular, we also classify as development banks all those institutions that are members of specific 
European associations such as the European Development Financial Institutions (EDFI), an association 
of export credit agencies mainly focused on the development of private enterprises in developing and 
emerging economies with the mandate to foster growth in sustainable business, and the Network of 
European Financial Institutions for SMEs (NEFI), whose public mission is to facilitate access to finance 
growth and internationalization of SMEs by offering them financial services and expertise. 
7 Subsidiaries are only excluded when the ownership share is larger than 50%, approximately assuming 
this as the minimum percentage of ownership that is needed for consolidation. 
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Financial data are collected from the Orbis Bank Focus database (BvD). Since this 
dataset is currently restricted to only 3-5 years of data, we retrieve older financial data 
by accessing BvD Bankscope historic disks.8 Notwithstanding available data starting 
from 1987, our empirical analysis focuses on the time interval 2002-2015 since we have 
very few available observations before this period. Indeed, available observations 
increase significantly after 2002, when they are still around 50 percent of the available 
observations in the most recent years. 
Further data cleaning is carried out in order to prevent the analysis from being 
distorted by unwanted factors. First, we drop the top and bottom 2% of firm-year 
observations with respect to the Loans Growth variable (our main dependent variable 
of the regression model introduced in Section 4) since these observations are likely to 
be affected by M&As, de-mergers or other structural (non-operating) changes. We also 
clean the dataset by eliminating inconsistent information (e.g. negative values for 
financial items that are expected to be non-negative). Finally, we drop all firm-year 
observations with missing values for Loans Growth or one of the main control variables 
in our regression model, i.e. Total Assets (lagged value), Non-Interest Revenues over 
Total Assets (lagged value) or Shareholders’ funds over Total Assets (lagged value). 
We remain with an unbalanced panel of 40,201 bank-year observations referring to 
4,228 banks and 73 development banks. 
																																																								
8 The merging of historical and current financial information from BvD is complicated by the fact that 
the BvD ID number, by which BvD identifies each bank, may change over time. Therefore, before the 
merger, we had to replace the old IDs with the most recent ones. By referring to the BvD ID Change 
Lookup tool, it is possible to obtain the list of BvD ID changes that involved our sample of banks within 
the reference period. For a similar merging procedure on Orbis data, see also Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015). 
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Table A.1 of the Appendix presents the descriptive statistics for the main bank 
characteristics of our interest, comparing development banks with the rest of the 
banking system.9 Data reveal interesting differences between development banks and 
the other (non-development) banks in our sample. On average, development banks are 
three times the size in terms of total assets (TA), they have higher capital ratios (CAP) 
and a lower incidence of the loan portfolio (LOANS), which is mainly due to the weight 
of their portfolio on equity investments, as suggested by inspection of individual data. 
Development banks also display a faster annual increase in loans relative to total assets 
(DLOANS), despite that the difference is statistically significant only in the subsample 
of “full democracies.” Interestingly, in both the two subsamples, development banks 
also exhibit a statistically significant lower incidence of operating expenses (OPEX) 
compared to other financial intermediaries, due, among other things, to the significantly 
lower number of employees per asset volume and their wholesale business model. 
Figure 1 compares the distribution by total assets of development banks and other 
(non-development) banks. After separating development banks at their median asset 
size (i.e. about 15.1 EUR thousands, in natural logarithms), we find that the larger 
development banks (shown darkly shaded in the figure) are placed above the 90th 
percentile of the distribution referred to non-development banks (dashed line), while 
the smaller development banks (shown lightly shaded in the figure) are placed between 
the 22nd and the 90th percentile. There are no development banks collocated below the 
																																																								
9 Descriptive statistics are obtained after winsorizing all the financial ratios, since they are shown to vary 
substantially within our sample. The winsorizing procedure replaces values above the 98th percentile 
and below the 2nd percentile respectively with the 98th percentile and the 2nd percentile. By contrast, 
our regressions are estimated without applying this winsorizing procedure, but we finally checked that 
the main results hold even after winsorizing.	
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22nd percentile (i.e. about 11.3 EUR thousands, in natural logarithms). 
Figure 1 –Distribution of DBs and non-DBs by size 
 
In the event that the coefficients of our model specifications depend on bank size, 
the different distribution of development banks and non-development banks will bias 
our estimates. For this reason, in the econometric analysis we also run all the 
regressions within separate size classes, so that all the coefficients are allowed to vary 
with asset size. In particular, we consider the following groups: (i) the whole sample 
includes all the available observations; (ii) the smaller DB’s size class includes banks 
in the percentiles 22-90 by total assets; (iii) the larger DBs’ size class includes banks 
above the 90th percentile. This setting allows to verify if (and how) the estimates are 
influenced by the relative size of development banks compared to other banks. 
3.2 Democratic development 
In order to consider the institutional characteristics of the different countries in 
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which development banks operate, we also collect data on institutional quality at the 
country level. Specifically, we refer to constitutional democratic development 
(DEMOC), measured by the Polity IV Project on a zero-to-ten scale, with zero 
indicating that there is no institutional democracy and 10 indicating “full” democracy. 
Indeed, in line with Delis et al., (2017), we consider “‘democratic development’ as a 
general institutional umbrella that primarily encompasses changes in constitutional 
characteristics of democracy, such as a system of free elections, the evolution of checks 
and balances by independent political bodies, and the evolution of civil liberties.” In 
Section 6 we also test the robustness of our main findings when considering specific 
subcomponents of the DEMOC indicator, such as the Executive Constraints 
(XCONST), or alternative country indexes, such as the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI).10 
For the purpose of our study, we split the main sample in two macro-areas, based on 
the “maturity” of democracy in each country. Since most of the European countries in 
our sample are classified as “full democracies” (DEMOC=10), we compare the lending 
behavior of development banks and other banks in these countries with their peers in 
“flawed democracies” (DEMOC < 10). Countries are allowed to move from one group 
to another according to the annual value of DEMOC. The aforementioned table A.1 
shows that in the time interval 2002-2015 development banks report a higher annual 
DLOANS in both the two subsamples, despite that the difference is statistically 
significant only in the subsample of “full democracies.” The main objective of our study 
is to examine how this difference is affected by the electoral cycles after controlling for 
the business cycles. 
																																																								
10 Kaufmann et al (2010). 
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3.3 Electoral cycles and business cycles  
Given our specific interest in the lending behavior of development banks over the 
electoral cycle, we also collect data on electoral years using the Database of Political 
Institutions 2017 (Cruz et al., 2018). We consider presidential elections in countries 
with a presidential system and legislative elections otherwise. In line with Dreher and 
Vaubel (2004, 2009), we build a continuous variable,  𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇%,' , that is defined as the 
share of the year t that falls within the twelve months prior to a national election in 
country c.11 By introducing this measure, we  take into account that the time of the year 
in which the election takes place could be relevant for the timing of an eventual 
opportunistic behavior of development banks. Indeed, if elections take place early in 
the calendar year t, electoral incentives and politically-motivated lending are likely to 
realize in year t-1. 
Finally, we recur to IMF databases in order to collect information on GDP growth, 
as a proxy for business cycles at the country level. Indeed, we mentioned before that 
according to the literature on the political business cycle, there may exist a correlation 
between the electoral cycles and the business cycles. Consequently, without controlling 
for GDP growth, our analysis on the different behavior of development banks and 
private banks in a pre-electoral period could be severely distorted by the lack of 
attention on the contemporaneous effects of the business cycle.12 In addition, the 
																																																								
11 Following the example of Dreher and Vaubel (2009), ‘if the election took place in February, the index 
would take the value of 2/12 in that year and 10/12 in the year before’. 
12 Micco et al. (2007) adopt a similar approach in order to analyze the different behavior of foreign and 
state-owned banks with respect to private domestic banks over both the electoral cycle and the business 
cycle. 
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analysis of differential reactions of development banks and private banks to the 
business cycle is also relevant by itself. Even if it is not the main focus of this paper, it 
adds a relevant piece of information on potential good features of development banks’ 
activity. Indeed, if the empirical results revealed that the lending of development banks 
is more resilient than the lending of other banks to the business cycle, this would add 
an argument in favor of development banks’ activity that could potentially compensate 
for, or even outweigh, the possible inefficiencies due to opportunistic political behavior. 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between GDP growth (DGDP) and the change in 
loans (DLOANS) for each country-year. Specifically, we measure the aggregate 
measure of DLOANS for each country-year as the weighted average of the banks 
belonging to each country, with weights assigned according to total assets at the 
beginning of each year (end of previous year). The prediction lines and confidence 
intervals referring to the entire banking system reveal, as is reasonable to expect, a 
positive relationship between DGDP and DLOANS. However, the different slope of the 
prediction lines suggests counter-cyclical behavior of European development banks, 
with less sustained loan growth in boom years but greater resilience during downturns, 
when credit supply from other lenders typically slows down. This evidence offers a 
positive picture of the behavior of the development banks in terms of their beneficial 
support to the real economy and confirms that the omission of the DGDP variable would 
severely affect our next analysis on the different lending behavior of development 
banks over the electoral cycle relative to other banks. 
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Figure 2 – DLOANS and DGDP by Country-Year 
 
 
In the next section, we focus on econometrics with the aim of better disentangling 
the lending behavior of development banks from that of other financial institutions in 
the period before elections and to test the hypotheses formulated in Section 2.2.  
 
4. The model 
In order to meet the aim of this study, and therefore to assess whether the lending 
behavior of development banks is influenced by political considerations and 
opportunistic pre-electoral behavior, we investigate the different reactions of 
development banks to periods of political change, by interacting the election variable 
with a dummy that takes the value of one for development banks. As pointed out in 
Section 3.4, and in line with Micco et al. (2007), we also introduce GDP growth by 
country and year in order to control for the influence of the business cycle on loans 
growth and to take into account the possible correlation between electoral cycles and 
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business cycles. 
Our regression model is the following: 
𝑌),%,' =+𝛽- ∙ 𝑍%,'(-) ∙ 𝐷𝐵)- ++𝛿6 ∙ 𝑋),'89(6)6 + 𝜃%,' + 𝜂) + 𝜀),%,' 
where 𝑌),%,'(≡ ∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆),%,') is loans growth, 𝐷𝐵) is a dummy variable that takes value 
one if i is a development bank, 𝑍%,'(-) is a set of time-variant country-specific variables, 
and 𝑋),'89(6)  is a set of time-variant bank-specific characteristics as of year t-1. The model 
also incorporates bank fixed effects 𝜂) and a set of country-year dummies 𝜃%,'. 
Following Dinc (2005) and Micco et al. (2007), we define loans growth C𝑌),%,' ≡ ∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆),%,'D as the change in loans in year t divided by total assets in year t-
1. The set of time-variant country-specific variables include the GDP growth rate of 
country c in year t E𝑍%,'(9) ≡ ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃%,'H and  the election variable that measures to what 
extent year t in country c overlaps with an election season E𝑍%,'(I) ≡ 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇%,'H. 
The coefficient 𝛽9 on the interaction term ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃%,' ∙ 𝐷𝐵) measures the differential 
effect of GDP growth on the loans growth of development banks with respect to other 
banks in their same countries. Positive (negative) values of 𝛽9 would signal a more 
(less) pro-cyclical lending behavior of development banks with respect to the rest of 
the banking system. The coefficient 𝛽I on the interaction term 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇%,' ∙ 𝐷𝐵) , which 
measures the differential effect induced by elections, is the coefficient of main interest 
for testing the hypotheses of Section 2.2. Indeed, a statistically significant coefficient 
would suggest that the electoral cycle affects the lending activity of the development 
banks to a different extent than it does for the other banks, consequently supporting a 
political view of development banks. In particular, we expect that 𝛽I is not significant 
in the whole sample (Hypothesis 1), while being positive and statistically significant in 
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the subsample of “flawed democracies” (Hypothesis 2). 
Taking into account our descriptive statistics of Section 3, we also include bank-
specific control variables targeted at capturing size (the logarithm of lagged total assets, 𝑋),'89(9) ≡ 𝐿𝑇𝐴),'89) and capitalization (the lagged equity-to-assets ratio, 𝑋),'89(I) ≡𝐶𝐴𝑃),'89) of bank i at time t-1. We also include non-interest income as a share of total 
assets (𝑋),'89(J) ≡ 𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑇),'89), in order to control for the type of banking activity and 
the business model (Micco et al., 2007). 
Bank fixed effects 𝜂) allow us to control for all the time-invariant differences 
between banks in the sample, including time-independent differences between 
development banks and the rest of the banking system, and institutional differences 
across their home countries. At the same time, the set of dummies for country-year 
specific effects 𝜃%,' controls for the omission of time-varying country-level variables, 
such as the inflation rate, the interest rates or yearly changes in exchange rates. 
Consequently, the inclusion of country-year fixed effects permits the comparison of 
differences in loans growth between development banks and non-development banks 
after controlling for all the unobserved country characteristics that are allowed to vary 
over time. 
The coefficients of the static panel data model can be estimated using standard fixed 
effects (FE) or random effects (RE) estimators. The RE is more efficient than the FE 
estimator, but it relies on the additional assumption of no correlation between 𝜂) and 𝜀),%,'. Since the Hausman test reveals a significant divergence between the FE and RE 
estimators,13 we reject the null hypothesis that individual effects are random and, 
																																																								
13 The relevant value of the χ2-test is χ2(353) = 2312.52, with a p-value = 0.0000. The number of degrees 
of freedom (df = 353) is shown in parentheses after the χ2. 
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consequently, we adopt the FE approach.14 
Finally, we recur to robust standard errors that account for possible	
heteroskedasticity or within-panel serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error term 𝜀)%'. 
 
5. Empirical results  
5.1 Baseline estimations 
Table 2 shows the coefficients estimated for the whole sample in order to test 
Hypothesis 1. The first regression (column 1) focuses on the responses of the lending 
behavior to changes in the bank-specific characteristics, without distinguishing between 
development banks and other banks.15  The second regression (column 2) introduces a 
differential lending behavior of development banks over the business cycle by 
introducing the interaction term ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃%,' ∙ 𝐷𝐵). We find that the annual increase in 
loans relative to bank size is less sensitive to economic fluctuations for development 
banks than for the rest of the banking system, as indicated by the significant and 
negative coefficient on the interaction term. This lower sensitivity can be attributed to 
a more counter-cyclical stance of development banks with respect to other financial 
institutions, which is confirmed both in full and flawed democracies. Finally, the third 
regression (column 3) specifically tests the influence of the electoral cycle on the 
differential lending behavior of development banks, by introducing the interaction term 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇%,' ∙ 𝐷𝐵) and still controlling for the effects of economic fluctuations.  
																																																								
14 Results obtained with RE did not lead to different conclusions (available upon request). 
15 As expected, the negative coefficients on LTA signal that higher bank size is accompanied by lower 
levels of loans growth (DLOANS). 
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For the overall sample, the coefficient on the interaction term is not significantly 
different from zero. This estimate shows that the lending activity of European 
development banks does not change during electoral years compared to that of other 
banks, thus providing no support for a political view of development banks. 
Following the considerations of Section 3.1, we also rerun the regressions for 
different size classes: the smaller DBs’ size class (columns 4-6), and the larger DBs’ 
size class (columns 7-9). Interestingly, the coefficient on ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃%,' ∙ 𝐷𝐵) is more 
negative in the last subsample, thus suggesting that the counter-cyclical behavior of 
development banks is more relevant among larger banks. By contrast, the interaction 
term on 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇%,' ∙ 𝐷𝐵) is not significant in all of the estimations, failing to reject 
hypothesis 1 independently from the bank size. 
Table 2 – Elections and lending activity 
Dependent variable: Change in Loans (DLOANS) 
 Whole Sample Smaller DBs' size class Larger DBs' size class 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
LTA -3.64*** -3.65*** -3.65*** -4.78*** -4.79*** -4.79*** -4.40*** -4.43*** -4.43*** 
 [0.40] [0.40] [0.40] [0.42] [0.42] [0.42] [0.87] [0.86] [0.86] 
NONINT -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.09 0.09 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] 
CAP -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.11* -0.11* -0.11* 
 [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] 
          
DGDP * DB  -0.37*** -0.37***  -0.38*** -0.38***  -0.60*** -0.60*** 
  [0.11] [0.11]  [0.13] [0.13]  [0.18] [0.19] 
ELECT * DB   0.11   0.14   -0.09 
   [0.84]   [1.14]   [1.32] 
Bank f.e. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-year f.e. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 40,201 40,201 40,201 29,928 29,928 29,928 4,650 4,650 4,650 
N. of countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 24 24 24 
r2 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.45 0.46 0.46 
The regression is run within separate size classes: (i) the whole sample (columns 1-3); (ii) the smaller 
DB’s size class (columns 4-6), which includes banks in the percentiles 22-90 by total assets; (iii) the 
larger DBs’ size class (columns 7-9), which includes banks above the 90th percentile (see Section 3.1 
for details). The dependent variable DLOANS measures the change in total loans in year t as a share of 
total assets in year t-1. LTA is the logarithm of lagged total assets in EUR thousands. NONINT is the 
lagged share of non-interest income over average total assets (i.e. the average of total assets at the 
beginning of the year and at the year’s end). CAP is the lagged share of total equity over total assets. 
DGDP is the GDP growth rate by country and year. ELECT is the share of the year t that falls within the 
twelve months prior to a national election in country c. DB is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one for development banks. The reference period is 2002-2015. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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However, it could be still possible that development banks are more likely to 
increase lending in election years if they are located in countries with flawed 
democracies and lower constraints on the executive power. Therefore, in Table 3 we 
test Hypothesis 2 by running the same regressions for the subsamples of “full 
democracies” (DEMOC=10) and “flawed democracies” (DEMOC<10) respectively. 
When splitting the sample according to the level of constitutional democratic 
development of each country, the coefficient of the interaction term 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇%,' ∙ 𝐷𝐵) is 
still non-significant for the “full democracies” subsample (columns 1-3), confirming no 
support for a political view of development banks in countries with the highest level of 
institutional quality. 
By contrast, the coefficient of the interaction term 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇%,' ∙ 𝐷𝐵) is significant at the 
five percent level and strongly positive for the subsample of “flawed democracies” 
when the analysis is limited to larger development banks and other banks of comparable 
size (column 9). This empirical evidence supports the Hypothesis 2 that before elections 
development banks located in countries with flawed democracies increase their lending 
activity relatively more than other banks in their same countries, thus revealing that 
their lending decisions are actually more exposed to the pre-electoral, opportunistic 
behavior of the incumbent policymaker. The fact that this evidence is only confirmed 
in larger banks makes perfect sense. Indeed, it is reasonable to expect that only larger 
development banks have the necessary firepower to affect specific segments of the 
economy in the short-term, thus increasing the chances of the incumbent to be re-
elected. Then, it is just on larger development banks that policymakers eventually focus 
their opportunistic pressures. However, the subsample of larger development banks 
located in flawed democracies only includes few institutions, thus suggesting that 
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evidence of opportunistic pre-electoral behavior can only be reported for a very limited 
set of development banks.   
Table 3 - Elections and lending activity: subsample regressions by DEMOC levels 
Dependent variable: Change in Loans (DLOANS) 
 Full democracies (DEMOC = 10) Flawed democracies (DEMOC < 10) 
 Whole 
Sample 
Smaller DBs' 
size class 
Larger DBs' 
size class 
Whole 
Sample 
Smaller DBs' 
size class 
Larger DBs' 
size class 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LTA -4.11*** -4.98*** -3.95*** -3.11*** -4.39*** -6.29*** 
 [0.58] [0.41] [0.94] [0.55] [1.00] [1.88] 
NONINT 0.00 0.01 0.04 -0.00 0.01 0.20 
 [0.02] [0.01] [0.13] [0.01] [0.03] [0.31] 
CAP -0.05* -0.06 -0.08 0.02 0.07 -0.19 
 [0.03] [0.04] [0.06] [0.03] [0.05] [0.17] 
       
DGDP * DB -0.47*** -0.41** -0.45*** -0.27 -0.29* -1.30*** 
 [0.14] [0.19] [0.17] [0.18] [0.17] [0.44] 
ELECT * DB -1.19 -0.60 -1.03 2.84 1.34 7.40** 
 [0.93] [1.43] [1.32] [1.88] [1.81] [3.44] 
Bank f.e. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-year f.e. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 32,880 26,556 3,499 7,321 3,372 1,151 
N. of countries 17 17 17 13 13 10 
r2 0.25 0.26 0.37 0.29 0.35 0.62 
The sample is split based the level of constitutional democratic development (DEMOC), measured by 
the Polity IV Project on a zero-to-ten scale, with ten indicating “full democracy” and lower levels 
indicating “flawed democracies”. Countries are allowed to move from one group to another according to 
the annual value of DEMOC. The regression is run within separate size classes: (i) the whole sample 
(columns 1 and 4); (ii) the smaller DB’s size class (columns 2 and 5), which includes banks in the 
percentiles 22-90 by total assets; (iii) the larger DBs’ size class (columns 3 and 6), which includes banks 
above the 90th percentile (see Section 3.1 for details). The dependent variable DLOANS measures the 
change in total loans in year t as a share of total assets in year t-1. LTA is the logarithm of lagged total 
assets in EUR thousands. NONINT is the lagged share of non-interest income over average total assets 
(i.e. the average of total assets at the beginning of the year and at the year’s end). CAP is the lagged share 
of total equity over total assets. DGDP is the GDP growth rate by country and year. ELECT is the share 
of the year t that falls within the twelve months prior to a national election in country c. DB is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one for development banks. The reference period is 2002-2015. Robust 
standard errors in brackets. 
Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
In Table 3, all the coefficients are allowed to vary across the two subsamples, since 
we run separate regressions for “full democracies” and “flawed democracies” 
respectively. Although our main interest is on the significance of the interaction term 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇%,' ∙ 𝐷𝐵) within each group of countries, we are aware that separate regressions 
do not determine whether the coefficient on the interaction term is statistically different 
across the groups. By running a unique regression for the whole sample and adding a 
triple interaction term, we actually verified that the coefficient on 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇%,' ∙ 𝐷𝐵)  is 
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significantly higher in flawed democracies than in full democracies when considering 
the size class of larger development banks (see Table A.2 in the Appendix). 
Besides, we also verified that similar conclusions can be reached if we do not run 
separate regressions by size classes and we adopt a weighting strategy.  According to 
Micco et al. (2007) and Yeyati and Micco (2003), adopting a weighting scheme that 
assigns a higher weight to larger banks may produce more precise estimates if higher 
bank size is associated with lower measurement errors. Furthermore, given the larger 
weight assigned to larger banks, this weighting scheme may better reflect the 
comparison of the lending behavior of development banks with that of the banking 
industry at an aggregate level, implicitly presuming that the aggregate behavior of credit 
demand and supply is more influenced by changes observed in largest banks. 
Accordingly, we also rerun our baseline estimations weighting each bank-year 
observation by the bank’s share of lagged total assets within the whole dataset in the 
same year, so that the weight for bank i at time t is given by  𝑤),' = MNO,PQR	∑ MNU,PQRVUWR  .16 
Estimations obtained after the adoption of the weighting scheme do not contradict  our 
main results (see Table A.3 of the Appendix), confirming that the lending activity of 
European development banks does not change during electoral years compared to that 
of other banks, with the exception of “flawed democracies” where the lending behavior 
of development banks is more exposed to the pre-electoral, opportunistic behavior of 
the incumbent policymaker (the coefficient on  𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇%,' ∙ 𝐷𝐵) is strongly positive and 
																																																								
16 Since the weighting scheme assigns higher weights to years with a lower number of observations (the 
denominator ∑ 𝑇𝐴X,'89YXZ9 	tends to decrease with the number of available observations in year t-1), it may 
also have the advantage of correcting the estimations for the different number of observations in different 
years, since data availability in the dataset tend to increase over time. 
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significant at the 1 percent level in flawed democracies). Besides, the counter-cyclical 
behavior of development banks (i.e. the negative coefficient on ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃%,' ∙ 𝐷𝐵)) is 
confirmed in both full and flawed democracies. 
Overall, the results of this section may be regarded as in line with those obtained 
from Dinc (2005) and Micco et al. (2007) who did not find support for the political 
view of state-owned banks in industrial countries, while pointing out that the lending 
stance of state-owned banks in emerging countries becomes significantly more 
accommodating in election years. However, our investigation is specifically focused on 
contemporary development banks, which differ from other state-owned banks because 
of their distinctive mandates and targets (see Section 2.1). 
5.2 Additional analyses 
The behavior of development banks in flawed democracies over the electoral cycle 
deserves further investigation. Indeed, an increase in development banks’ lending 
during election years may simply represent the response to higher demand for 
development banks’ loans in pre-electoral months, rather than the effect of 
opportunistic behavior. The pattern of interest margins may provide some further 
explanation. Indeed, following the reasoning of Micco et al. (2007), the absence of a 
significant increase in interest income of development banks during election years 
would lead to excluding the possibility that the corresponding increase in development 
banks’ lending simply represents the response to higher demand. Consequently, our 
next analysis focuses on the interest rate charged by banks (proxied by the ratio of 
interest income over earning assets, INTINC) as a dependent variable. Table 4 shows 
that no differential effects characterize the behavior of interest income over earning 
assets in development banks with respect to the rest of the banking system across the 
cycles (the coefficients on 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇%,' ∙ 𝐷𝐵) are never statistically significant). This 
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evidence is confirmed in both full democracies and flawed democracies, independently 
from size class. Then, the positive change in loans extended by large development 
banks during election years in flawed democracies is more likely to reflect political 
influence on their activity and the will to finance businesses in exchange for higher 
electoral support. 
Table 4 – Elections and interest margin 
Dependent variable: INTINC 
 All countries Full democracies (DEMOC = 10) 
Flawed democracies 
(DEMOC < 10) 
 Smaller DBs' 
size class 
Larger DBs' 
size class 
Smaller DBs' 
size class 
Larger DBs' 
size class 
Smaller DBs' 
size class 
Larger DBs' 
size class 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LTA 0.10 -0.03 0.03 -0.11 0.27 0.14 
 [0.11] [0.19] [0.10] [0.20] [0.28] [0.51] 
NONINT 0.01 0.11 -0.00 0.14 0.01** -0.05 
 [0.00] [0.08] [0.01] [0.09] [0.01] [0.05] 
CAP 0.02** 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.03** 0.08** 
 [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.04] 
       
DGDP * DB 0.10* 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.19*** -0.10 
 [0.05] [0.05] [0.09] [0.02] [0.07] [0.15] 
ELECT* DB -0.74 0.27 -1.10 0.09 -0.36 1.97 
 [0.58] [0.26] [0.75] [0.16] [0.95] [1.45] 
Bank f.e. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-year f.e. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 29,799 4,622 26,467 3,483 3,332 1,139 
N. of countries 27 24 17 17 13 10 
r2 0.49 0.42 0.65 0.51 0.28 0.38 
In columns 3-6, the sample is split based the level of constitutional democratic development (DEMOC), 
measured by the Polity IV Project on a zero-to-ten scale, with ten indicating “full democracy” and lower 
levels indicating “flawed democracies”. Countries are allowed to move from one group to another 
according to the annual value of DEMOC. The regression is run within separate size classes: (i) the 
smaller DB’s size class (columns 1, 3, and 5), which includes banks in the percentiles 22-90 by total 
assets; (ii) the larger DBs’ size class (columns 2, 4, and 6), which includes banks above the 90th 
percentile (see Section 3.1 for details). The dependent variable INTINC measures interest income as a 
share of average interest earning assets (i.e. the average of earning assets at the beginning of the year and 
at the year’s end). LTA is the logarithm of lagged total assets in EUR thousands. NONINT is the lagged 
share of non-interest income over average total assets (i.e. the average of total assets at the beginning of 
the year and at the year’s end). CAP is the lagged share of total equity over total assets. DGDP is the 
GDP growth rate by country and year. ELECT is the share of the year t that falls within the twelve months 
prior to a national election in country c. DB is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for 
development banks. The reference period is 2002-2015. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
A similar regression (available on request) introducing operating expenditures over 
total assets (OPEX) as dependent variable reveals that cost efficiency depends on the 
bank size (negative coefficient on LTA) and the type of business model (positive 
coefficient on NONINT), but no differential effects are found for development banks 
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over the electoral cycles, apart from smaller development banks in flawed democracies 
(the coefficient on 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇%,' ∙ 𝐷𝐵) is positive and significant at the 5 percent level in 
flawed democracies when considering the smaller development banks’ size class). This 
evidence suggests that where the political view applies to development banks, it 
primarily applies through the lending channel, although we cannot completely exclude 
the existence of political pressures on smaller development banks in flawed 
democracies intended to increase the number of employees in exchange for political 
support. 
6. Robustness checks 
In this section, we test the robustness of our baseline findings on the behavior of 
loans growth (∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆 ) over the cycles with respect to different measures for our 
electoral and institutional variables (Table 5 and 6) or different specifications of the 
regression model (Tables 7 and 8). 
6.1 Alternative measures of electoral and institutional variables 
Firstly, we repeat our estimations introducing different definitions of the election 
variable 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇%,' with respect to the continuous measure presented in Section 3.3. 
Following the procedure adopted by Dinc (2005), we alternatively define 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇%,' as 
a dummy variable that takes the value of one when elections take place. Year t is defined 
as an electoral year for country c if the elections are held between April of year t and 
March of year t+1. Again, the underlying assumption is that electoral incentives 
anticipate the elections themselves by some months. 
Table 5 shows that the main findings of our baseline estimations are entirely 
confirmed when considering this alternative election variable. The coefficient on 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇%,' ∙ 𝐷𝐵) is still positive and significant (at the 5 percent level) only in flawed 
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democracies when considering the size class of larger development banks. By contrast, 
in full democracies the negative coefficient becomes significant at the 1 percent level, 
providing no evidence of opportunistic pre-electoral behavior of development banks. 
Table 5 – Elections and lending activity: timing of elections (April-March dummy) 
Dependent variable: Change in Loans (DLOANS) 
 All countries Full democracies (DEMOC = 10) 
Flawed democracies 
(DEMOC < 10) 
 Smaller DBs' 
size class 
Larger DBs' 
size class 
Smaller DBs' 
size class 
Larger DBs' 
size class 
Smaller DBs' 
size class 
Larger DBs' 
size class 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LTA -4.79*** -4.43*** -4.97*** -3.95*** -4.39*** -6.35*** 
 [0.42] [0.86] [0.41] [0.94] [1.00] [1.88] 
NONINT 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.21 
 [0.02] [0.13] [0.01] [0.12] [0.03] [0.32] 
CAP -0.01 -0.11* -0.06 -0.08 0.07 -0.19 
 [0.03] [0.06] [0.04] [0.06] [0.05] [0.17] 
       
DGDP * DB -0.37*** -0.60*** -0.39** -0.46*** -0.29* -1.23*** 
 [0.13] [0.18] [0.20] [0.14] [0.17] [0.43] 
ELECT* DB 0.42 -0.11 0.51 -1.32* -0.02 6.50** 
 [0.86] [0.94] [1.11] [0.75] [1.31] [3.07] 
Bank f.e. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-year f.e. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 29,928 4,650 26,556 3,499 3,372 1,151 
N. of countries 27 24 17 17 13 10 
r2 0.30 0.46 0.26 0.37 0.35 0.62 
In columns 3-6, the sample is split based the level of constitutional democratic development (DEMOC), 
measured by the Polity IV Project on a zero-to-ten scale, with ten indicating “full democracy” and lower 
levels indicating “flawed democracies”. Countries are allowed to move from one group to another 
according to the annual value of DEMOC. The regression is run within separate size classes: (i) the 
smaller DB’s size class (columns 1, 3, and 5), which includes banks in the percentiles 22-90 by total 
assets; (ii) the larger DBs’ size class (columns 2, 4, and 6), which includes banks above the 90th 
percentile (see Section 3.1 for details). The dependent variable DLOANS measures the change in total 
loans in year t as a share of total assets in year t-1. LTA is the logarithm of lagged total assets in EUR 
thousands. NONINT is the lagged share of non-interest income over average total assets (i.e. the average 
of total assets at the beginning of the year and at the year’s end). CAP is the lagged share of total equity 
over total assets. DGDP is the GDP growth rate by country and year. ELECT is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if elections in country c occurred between April of year t and March of year t+1. 
DB is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for development banks. The reference period is 2002-
2015. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
One relevant identification assumption is that the lending activity of both 
development banks and non-development banks should follow parallel trends in non-
election years, i.e. it should behave similarly in the two groups, once controlling for 
other relevant derminants. In order to check if the assumption of parallel trends is 
fulfilled, we performed a counterfactual analysis in which the post-election year is 
chosen as the event that identifies a NON-ELECT dummy, to be tested in alternative to 
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the ELECT dummy of Table 5. This counterfactual analysis found no differential 
effects in the lending patterns of large development banks in flawed democracies in the 
post-election year (results available upon request). This evidence increases our 
confidence that the differential effects obtained in the previous analyses are just due to 
the election event. 
In addition, the positive coefficient on the interaction term for larger development 
banks in flawed democracies is also confirmed when simply considering [January, year 
t; December, year t] as the reference time window to identify the electoral year, instead 
of the convention [April, year t; March, year t+1]. Consequently, we can conclude that 
our main findings are not affected by the choice of the convention adopted to identify 
our electoral dummy. 
Similarly, we are interested to know how our main results change when splitting the 
sample according to other country-level institutional variables rather than our indicator 
of constitutional democratic development (DEMOC). First, we repeated the analysis 
considering the distinct subcomponents of the DEMOC indicator, according to the 
measures provided by the Polity IV Project. Interestingly, the specific subcomponent 
that affects more the difference of estimates between “full democracies” and “flawed 
democracies” is the XCONST indicator. XCONST measures Executive Constraints on 
a zero-to-seven scale, where the higher values indicate stronger institutionalized 
constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives. When we separately 
analyze countries with “full constraints on chief executive” (XCONST = 7) and 
countries with “flawed constraints on chief executive” (XCONST < 7), we find that the 
coefficient on 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇%,' ∙ 𝐷𝐵) is not significant in countries with full constraints on 
chief executive, while it is positive and significant (at the 10 percent level) in countries 
with flawed constraints when considering larger banks. This evidence suggests that pre-
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electoral, opportunistic pressures of the incumbent policymakers on development banks 
are less likely to occur in consolidated democracies where accountability groups (such 
as the legislature) have a relevant and effective authority in front of the executive 
power. 
We also adopt alternative country indexes, such as the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI),17 in order to test whether alternative measures of institutional quality 
have the same ability to isolate those countries where the political view of development 
banks is supported by empirical evidence. Table 6 shows the coefficients estimated on ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃%,' ∙ 𝐷𝐵) and 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇%,' ∙ 𝐷𝐵) (the other coefficients are not reported for the sake 
of brevity) when splitting the sample based on two different Governance Indicators: 
“voice and accountability” (VA) and “regulatory quality” (RQ). We run separate 
estimations for countries with high and low levels of these indicators, where high levels 
correspond with the top tercile of countries and low levels include the remaining 
countries. Once again, the negative coefficient on ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃%,' ∙ 𝐷𝐵) confirms the counter-
cyclical role played by development banks in almost all the subgroups. More 
importantly, the coefficient on 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇%,' ∙ 𝐷𝐵) is still positive and significant at the 10 
percent level in countries with lower institutional quality (i.e. low levels of VA and 
RQ).18 Note also that two additional WGI indicators (“rule of law” and “control of 
																																																								
17 See Kaufmann et al. (2010). 
18 By contrast, the coefficient on the same interaction term is negative and significantly different from 
zero (at the 5 percent level) when considering the larger size classes in countries with high levels of VA 
and RQ (columns 3). Since this result is apparently counterintuitive (the coefficients would the  expected 
to be non-significant), we also run the same regression without including country-year fixed effects and 
adding the non-interacted variables ELECT and GDP,  in order to measure the specific effects of political 
elections and GDP growth on the lending behavior of non-development banks. We find that the negative 
interaction term on ELECT * DB is due to a significant increase in the lending activity of large non-
development banks rather than to a decrease in the lending activity of large development banks. While 
several reasons may justify this empirical evidence for non-development banks (e.g. a different behavior 
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corruption”) lead to identical results, since they imply the same sample split based on 
RQ. Overall, better legal and political institutions are confirmed to act as a defense 
against opportunistic political pressures and interferences on the lending activity of 
development banks. 
Table 6 – Elections and lending activity: alternative country indexes 
Dependent variable: Change in Loans (DLOANS) 
 
Sample split based on ‘voice and accountability’ (VA): 
High levels of VA Low levels of VA 
 Whole Sample 
Smaller DBs' 
size class 
Larger DBs' 
size class 
Whole 
Sample 
Smaller DBs' 
size class 
Larger DBs' 
size class 
Coefficients: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DGDP * DB -0.47*** -0.40 -0.49*** -0.37*** -0.38*** -0.98*** 
 [0.12] [0.31] [0.15] [0.14] [0.14] [0.33] 
ELECT * DB -0.66 -1.34 -2.28** 2.05 0.96 5.31* 
 [0.85] [1.71] [0.97] [1.37] [1.48] [2.77] 
 
 
Sample split based on ‘regulatory quality’ (RQ): 
High levels of RQ Low levels of RQ 
 Whole Sample 
Smaller DBs' 
size class 
Larger DBs' 
size class 
Whole 
Sample 
Smaller DBs' 
size class 
Larger DBs' 
size class 
Coefficients: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DGDP * DB -0.47*** -0.37 -0.51*** -0.38** -0.38*** -0.97*** 
 [0.12] [0.30] [0.15] [0.15] [0.14] [0.37] 
ELECT * DB -0.66 -1.18 -2.15** 2.09 1.10 4.91* 
 [0.85] [1.61] [0.96] [1.43] [1.54] [2.70] 
 
The sample is split based on alternative Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), and specifically: 
“voice and accountability” (VA) and “regulatory quality” (RQ). High levels include the top tercile of 
European countries ranked in terms of each indicator. Low levels include the remaining countries. The 
regression is run within separate size classes: (i) the whole sample (columns 1 and 4); (ii) the smaller 
DB’s size class (columns 2 and 5), which includes banks in the percentiles 22-90 by total assets; (iii) the 
larger DBs’ size class (columns 3 and 6), which includes banks above the 90th percentile (see Section 
3.1 for details). The dependent variable DLOANS measures the change in total loans in year t as a share 
of total assets in year t-1. DGDP is the GDP growth rate by country and year. ELECT is the share of the 
year t that falls within the twelve months prior to a national election in country c. DB is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one for development banks. The following explanatory variables are also included 
in the regressions, although the estimated coefficients are not reported for the sake of brevity: the 
logarithm of lagged total assets in EUR thousands (LTA); the lagged share of non-interest income over 
average total assets (NONINT); the lagged share of total equity over total assets (CAP). All the 
estimations include bank fixed effects and country-year fixed effects. The reference period is 2002-2015. 
Robust standard errors in brackets. 
Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
																																																								
of credit demand around political elections, or a redistribution of credit supply from smaller banks to 
larger banks before elections), what is relevant for our analysis is that there is no evidence of development 
banks changing their lending behavior opportunistically before elections in countries with higher 
institutional quality. 
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Interestingly, in Europe, the splitting based on constitutional democratic 
development and institutional quality is also largely reflected in the geographical 
division between Western and Eastern Europe, since historical reasons stand behind the 
different levels of democratic consolidation and the strength of rules and institutions 
that govern economic and social interactions. A sample split based on this geographical 
divide reveals that the positive coefficient on the interaction term 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇%,' ∙ 𝐷𝐵) is 
actually confirmed in the subsample of Eastern European countries independently from 
the size classes, but not in Western Europe (see Table A.5 in the Appendix).19 This 
evidence adds relevant information to our analysis, considering the particularly 
important role that development banks have played in the transformation of the Eastern 
European centralized economies into market economies after the Soviet collapse. 
Differences in the lending structure and the banking systems between the two groups 
of countries may contribute to explain the different lending behavior of development 
banks with respect to other banks, adding to the political aspects mentioned above. 
In line with these last considerations, we also replicated our regressions controlling 
for European Union membership (results available upon request). Indeed, some Central 
and Eastern European countries entered the European Union during the time span 
considered. This event may affect the banking system and somehow interfere with our 
estimation of the lending behavior of development banks in pre-election periods. 
Results obtained after including an EU dummy, which is equal to 1 starting from the 																																																								
19	Specifically, the 27 countries of our sample are split in the following two macro-areas: (i) Western 
Europe, including older EU member states and EFTA countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom); (ii) Eastern Europe, including newer EU member states, CEFTA countries and other member 
countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States Free Trade Area (Bulgaria, Belarus, Croatia, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey 
and Ukraine).	
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first year t that a country c enter the European Union, does not affect our main 
conclusions. 
 
6.2 Alternative specifications 
The model presented in Section 4 assumes that the data generating process is 
accurately described by static relationships. However, our baseline estimations may be 
severely biased by the exclusion of lagged dependent variables in the model 
specification. In this section, we introduce one or more lagged dependent variables, 
allowing for the modeling of a partial adjustment mechanism. Then, we can rewrite our 
model as: 
𝑌),%,' =+𝛼X ∙ 𝑌),%,'8XX ++E𝛽- ∙ 𝑍%,'(-) ∙ 𝐷𝐵) + 𝛾- ∙ 𝑍%,'(-)H- ++𝛿6 ∙ 𝑋),'89(6)6 + 𝜃' + 𝜂) + 𝜀),%,' 
where 𝑌),%,' , 𝑍%,'(-), and 𝑋),'89(6)  are exactly the same variables defined in section 4. Then,  
in the new specification of the model we just apply the following changes: (i) we 
introduce j lags of the dependent variable among the regressors; (ii) we substitute the 
set of dummies for country-year effects 𝜃%,' with year dummies 𝜃'; (iii) we include in 
the estimation model the non-interacted variables 𝑍%,'(-) (i.e. 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇%,' and ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃%,') 
since they are no more absorbed by country-year dummies. 
The choice to remove the country-year dummies is justified by the need to reduce 
the ‘too many instruments’ problem that typically characterizes the dynamic panel 
estimators (Roodman, 2009). On the one hand, this choice prevents us from controlling 
for all the possible country-year effects. On the other hand, it permits us to measure the 
specific effects of political elections and GDP growth on the lending behavior of non-
development banks (and not only the differential effect on the lending behavior of 
development banks). Then, the impact of 𝑍%,'(-)on loans growth is given by 𝛽- for the 
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non-development banks, while 𝛽- + 𝛾-  measures the impact for development banks. 
The estimation of 𝛽- adds interesting information to our analysis although the 
coefficient on the interaction term  𝛾-	is still the relevant one in order to test our main 
hypotheses. 
Once dynamic relationships (i.e. lagged dependent variables) are introduced, least 
squares methods on fixed effects or random effects models produce biased and 
inconsistent estimates (see Baltagi, 2001). Nickell (1981) shows that this bias is 
especially larger in a context of ‘short-T, large-N’ dataset. One common approach to 
deal with dynamic panel data models involves the generalized method-of-moments 
(GMM) (Hansen, 1982). In particular, we recur to system GMM estimators developed 
by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). System GMM estimation: 
(a) transforms the regression equation to remove any omitted variable bias created by 
unobserved heterogeneity (bank-specific effects); (b) instruments the right-hand-side 
variables of the transformed equation using lagged values of the original regressors to 
eliminate potential parameter inconsistency arising from the dynamic panel bias; (c) 
combines the transformed equation in a system with the original regression in levels, in 
order to improve efficiency and consistency. The instruments for the regression in 
levels are the lagged differences. 
The system GMM estimator offers relevant improvements upon the difference 
GMM estimator (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988; Arellano and Bond, 1991), which excludes 
step (c), due to the higher quality of the internal instruments.20 However, it requires an 
additional assumption that changes in any instrumenting variables are uncorrelated with 
																																																								
20 Indeed, the lagged levels are rather weak instruments for the regression equation in differences, 
especially when the explanatory variables are persistent over time. This weak instrument problem can 
induce biases in finite samples and poor precision even asymptotically. 
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the bank-specific effects. Since postestimation tests seem to confirm that these 
additional restrictions are not to be rejected, we base our estimation approach on the 
system GMM estimator.21 
In our system GMM estimation, the transformed equation of step (b) is obtained by 
recurring to ‘forward orthogonal deviations’ (Arellano and Bover, 1995).22 Moreover, 
instruments are ‘collapsed’ in order to efficiently correct for instrument proliferation 
(Roodman, 2009). Finally, we use two-step GMM estimation and the Windmeijer 
correction, which adjusts the covariance matrix to minimize the downward bias of the 
two-step standard errors in finite samples (Windmeijer, 2005). Standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust and clustered by the panel identifier, i.e., 
individual banks. 
For comparison, Table 7 summarizes the results obtained with three alternative 
econometric procedures: Pooled OLS regressions (columns 1, 4, and 7), fixed effects 
OLS regressions (columns 2, 5, and 8), and system GMM (columns 3, 6, and 9). Once 
again, we split the sample based on the DEMOC variable at the country level, and all 
the regressions are performed in the different size classes considered. The coefficients 
																																																								
21 Since the aim of this work is to test the existence of an opportunistic behavior of development banks 
in election periods (i.e. a positive and significant coefficient on the ELECT * DB interaction term), our 
preference for the system GMM also represents a conservative choice, since difference GMM produces 
higher standard errors and, consequently, lower rejection rates for the null hypothesis that a coefficient 
is zero. 
22 With respect to orthogonal deviations transformation, the alternative first-difference transformation 
magnifies gaps in unbalanced panels, since it subtracts lagged observations from the contemporaneous 
one. Orthogonal deviations minimize data loss by subtracting the average of all future available 
observations of a variable. However, we verified that the results are reasonably robust to the choice of 
transformation. 
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on bank-level control variables (LTA, NONINT, CAP) are not reported for the sake of 
brevity, but they are in line with the baseline estimations of Section 5.1.  
In line with the existing literature on the macroeconomic determinants of bank 
lending, GDP growth (DGDP) has positive and statistically significant coefficients, 
which is coherent with banks increasing their loans during period of economic 
expansions. At the same time, in full democracies the positive and strongly significant 
coefficient on the ELECT dummy reveals higher bank lending in election years. In part, 
this may reflect the fact that the lending behavior of private banks is also possibly 
influenced by the power of government. 
More importantly, in system GMM estimations the coefficient on the interaction 
term 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇%,' ∙ 𝐷𝐵) is negative and significant (at the 5 percent level) in full 
democracies when considering the size class of smaller development banks (column 6). 
This evidence not only rejects the political view of development banks, but rather it 
seems to suggest a lower lending activity of small development banks in periods of 
political uncertainty. By contrast, the coefficient on 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇%,' ∙ 𝐷𝐵) is still strongly 
positive and significant in flawed democracies when considering the size class of larger 
development banks (column 9), consequently confirming the opportunistic pre-
electoral behavior of some development banks in countries with lower institutional 
quality. 
In order to determine the appropriateness of our GMM estimations, we report the 
results of two main tests. The first test examines the hypothesis that the error term is 
not second-order serially correlated (the error term of the transformed equation is 
expected to be first-order serially correlated by construction). We introduce two lags of 
the dependent variables (j=2), since this is the model specification that permits to obtain 
the lowest p-value of the AR(2) test. 
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The second test is a ‘difference-in-Sargan/Hansen’ test used to examine the validity 
of subsets of instruments, under the null of joint validity of the full instrument set. 
Specifically, we report the Sargan/Hansen statistics referring to the system GMM 
instruments for the levels equation based on first-differences in the dependent variable 
(i.e. on lagged loans growth). The impossibility to reject the orthogonality conditions 
for this subset of instruments give support to the system GMM estimator with respect 
to the difference GMM estimator. 
Overall, the estimates of this section confirm that our main results are robust to the 
adoption of alternative measures of the relevant variables and to different econometric 
procedures. In particular, the GMM dynamic panel procedures comprehensively 
confront problems induced by the use of lagged dependent variables and bank-specific 
effects. Furthermore, GMM dynamic panel estimators use instruments that are 
‘internal’ (i.e. based on lags of the instrumented variables) and that are consequently 
useful when there are no good ‘external’ instruments to control the likely endogeneity 
of the explanatory variables. 
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Table 8 – Dynamic model: subsample regressions by DEMOC levels 
Dependent variable: Change in Loans (DLOANS) 
Full democracies (DEMOC = 10) 
 Whole Sample Smaller DBs’ size class Larger DBs’ size class 
 Pooled 
OLS 
FE 
OLS 
System 
GMM 
Pooled 
OLS 
FE 
OLS 
System 
GMM 
Pooled 
OLS 
FE 
OLS 
System 
GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
DLOANS(-1) 0.26*** 0.13*** 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.13*** 0.28*** 0.30*** 0.18*** 0.33*** 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] 
DLOANS(-2) 0.17*** 0.07*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.07*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.07*** 0.17*** 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] 
DGDP 0.60*** 0.82*** 0.39*** 0.66*** 0.93*** 0.57*** 0.48*** 0.55*** 0.21 
 [0.04] [0.05] [0.08] [0.05] [0.06] [0.08] [0.09] [0.12] [0.16] 
DGDP * DB -0.26** -0.41** -0.21 -0.53*** -0.55* -0.71** -0.15 -0.39** -0.12 
 [0.13] [0.20] [0.19] [0.18] [0.32] [0.28] [0.17] [0.18] [0.18] 
ELECT 1.68*** 1.69*** 1.52*** 2.00*** 2.05*** 1.92*** 1.26*** 1.19*** 1.35*** 
 [0.18] [0.16] [0.20] [0.20] [0.18] [0.24] [0.46] [0.44] [0.47] 
ELECT * DB 0.76 -0.46 -2.97** -0.47 -0.06 -5.15** 1.24 -0.86 0.17 
 [0.77] [1.18] [1.39] [1.14] [1.76] [2.10] [1.09] [1.29] [1.32] 
Bank controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Obs. 25,810 25,810 25,810 21,096 21,096 21,096 2,758 2,758 2,758 
No.individuals  3,017 3,017  2,360 2,360  301 301 
No.instruments   97   97   97 
AR2 (p-val)   0.00   0.00   0.28 
diff.test (p-val)    0.19   0.04   0.23 
 
Flawed democracies (DEMOC < 10) 
 Whole Sample Smaller DBs' size class Larger DBs' size class 
 Pooled 
OLS 
FE 
OLS 
System 
GMM 
Pooled 
OLS 
FE 
OLS 
System 
GMM 
Pooled 
OLS 
FE 
OLS 
System 
GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
DLOANS(-1) 0.16*** -0.03 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.05* 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.07 0.16** 
 [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.04] [0.05] [0.08] [0.07] 
DLOANS(-2) 0.04** -0.09*** 0.03 0.04* -0.06** 0.05 0.09** 0.00 0.10** 
 [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.04] [0.06] [0.05] 
DGDP 0.94*** 0.87*** 0.84*** 0.96*** 0.90*** 1.07*** 1.44*** 1.29*** 1.66*** 
 [0.08] [0.10] [0.13] [0.11] [0.14] [0.20] [0.16] [0.22] [0.23] 
DGDP * DB -0.05 -0.29 -0.05 -0.18 -0.44 -0.35 -0.41 -0.91** -0.86*** 
 [0.23] [0.29] [0.41] [0.25] [0.34] [0.41] [0.57] [0.38] [0.31] 
ELECT 1.81** 0.62 1.52* 0.83 -0.23 0.22 -1.58 -1.20 -1.34 
 [0.77] [0.76] [0.84] [0.95] [1.01] [1.09] [1.26] [1.09] [0.96] 
ELECT * DB 1.92 3.24 1.13 2.48 1.54 2.91 8.48* 10.89* 11.84** 
 [2.26] [3.06] [2.64] [2.53] [2.41] [2.72] [4.72] [6.03] [5.11] 
Bank controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Obs. 4,543 4,543 4,543 2,147 2,147 2,147 880 880 880 
No.individuals  888 888  394 394  110 110 
No.instruments   97   97   97 
AR2 (p-val)   0.01   0.13   0.77 
diff.test (p-val)    0.53   0.64   0.19 
The dependent variable DLOANS measures the change in total loans in year t as a share of total assets 
in year t-1. The model specification includes two lags of the dependent variable - DLOANS(-1) and 
DLOANS(-2). DGDP is the GDP growth rate by country and year. ELECT is the share of the year t that 
falls within the twelve months prior to a national election in country c. DB is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one for development banks. Bank controls include LTA, NONINT and LTA (see Table 7 
for descriptions), although the coefficients are not reported for the sake of brevity. Year dummies are 
included in all regressions. Pooled OLS regressions (columns 1, 4 and 7) and fixed effects OLS 
regressions (columns 2, 5 and 8) use robust standard errors clustered by bank. All system GMM estimates 
(columns 3, 6 and 9) use two-step GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) correction. In GMM 
estimates, we take DGDP and bank-specific variables to be predetermined – meaning that current values 
of these variables can be correlated with past and current error terms but not with future error terms. 
AR(2) (p-val) is the p-value of Arellano-Bond test for second order autocorrelated disturbances in first 
differences. Diff.test (p-val) is the p-value of the difference-in-Sargan/Hansen test referring to the system 
GMM instruments for the levels equation based on first-differences in the dependent variable.  
Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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7. Conclusions 
Misallocation of investments due to political interference has historically been one 
of the major concerns related to the action of state-owned banks. Our paper is the first 
to analyze the issue for all development banks headquartered in Europe, whose strategic 
role in catalyzing long-term finance and implementing EU policies has come to light 
after the 2008 crisis. 
Empirical findings point out that, overall, European development banks are not 
necessarily politically influenced, in the sense that they do not modify their lending 
activity during electoral years, which is the variable traditionally used to proxy the 
issue. From a policy point of view, these findings suggest that providing financial funds 
to development banks does not necessarily lead to an inappropriate use of public 
resources. Moreover, evidence of counter-cyclical stance in their lending activity 
confirms the beneficial role played by development banks in periods of economic 
slowdown. 
These encouraging results are in line with a growing body of literature on 
contemporary state-owned enterprises that reveals the significant positive changing 
dynamics that have shaped their contemporary features and roles, such as greater 
transparency and accountability, better compliance with ethical and deontological 
requirements and strengthening in corporate governance rules and regulatory 
frameworks (Bernier et al. 2019; Karolyi and Liao, 2017; Musacchio and Lazzarini, 
2014; Bruton et al., 2015; Clò et al., 2017; Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014). 
However, we also find that the lending behavior of development banks under 
election years differs in countries with distinct institutional settings, revealing that an 
opportunistic pre-electoral behavior of development banks is more likely to materialize 
in countries with lower levels of democratic development. In fact, while there is no 
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evidence that politicians use development banks for electoral purposes in full 
democracies, there is some clear signal that large development banks in flawed 
democracies actually increase lending around elections at a statistically significant 
percentage more than the rest of the banking system, thus revealing the role played by 
politics in their lending decisions. 
We suggest that European policy makers should carefully consider these empirical 
evidences, given the role attributed to development banks in their contemporary agenda. 
Our results lead to think carefully about the role of legal and political institutions for a 
proper functioning of development banks and defenses against the distortions possibly 
arising from government ownership, although we are aware that other factors may have 
a role, such as the fact that market failures are less severe in more developed countries 
and alternative channels become available for the governments to support the economy 
(e.g. take-or-pay joint ventures and other types of public-private partnerships). Results 
also add to existing literature on the importance of institutional quality for the economic 
development and on its different impact on public and private enterprises.23 
Finally, differences in the quality of development banks’ governance need to be 
further explored. Professional management, sound risk management, internal control 
procedures, and the degree of independence are indeed key issues for the governance 
mechanism to remain free from political interference. Indeed, the absence of politically 
motivated lending in countries with higher institutional quality could be justified not 
only by the lower influence exerted by governments, but also by the better internal 
governance of development banks, reflecting the nationwide external governance. This 
awareness suggests interesting further development of future research. 
																																																								
23 For an in-depth analysis about the relationship between the quality of institutions and firm’s 
productivity, see Efendic et al. (2011) and Driffield et al. (2013). On the different impact on public and 
private enterprises see Castelnovo et al. (2018).  
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1 – Sample statistics 
    All countries   
Full Democracies 
(DEMOC = 10)   
Flawed Democracies 
(DEMOC < 10) 
    Banks DBs     Banks DBs     Banks DBs  
TA Mean 8.936 27.333 ***   7.956 28.461 ***   13.386 24.214  
  s.d. 81.691 71.556    73.207 75.157    112.324 60.551  
  N 39,444 757    32,324 556    7,120 201  
                       
DLOANS Mean 3.402 4.517 ***   2.897 3.707 ***   5.696 6.756  
  s.d. 8.043 9.668    6.082 8.410    13.567 12.255  
  N 39,444 757    32,324 556    7,120 201  
                       
LOANS Mean 57.650 47.589 ***   58.794 48.118 ***   52.455 46.123 *** 
  s.d. 17.468 25.965    16.555 26.726    20.328 23.735  
  N 39,444 757    32,324 556    7,120 201  
                       
CAP Mean 10.664 18.784 ***   9.159 17.831 ***   18.608 21.421 *** 
  s.d. 8.420 17.863    6.413 18.676    12.924 15.123  
  N 39,444 757    33,787 556    7,120 201  
                       
NONINT Mean 2.442 1.744 ***   1.150 1.736 ***   8.305 1.764 *** 
  s.d. 5.311 3.725    1.970 4.136    9.835 2.227  
  N 39,444 757    32,324 556    7,120 201  
                       
INTINC Mean 5.337 5.280    4.347 4.621 ***   9.866 7.098 *** 
  s.d. 3.079 3.257    1.398 2.610    4.349 4.076  
  N 39,243 755    32,204 554    7,039 201  
                       
OPEX Mean 3.931 1.752 ***   2.484 1.508 ***   10.513 2.426 *** 
  s.d. 5.644 2.389    1.877 2.362    10.386 2.339  
  N 39,332 756    32,242 555    7,090 201  
DBs denote the subsample of development banks, while Banks denotes the rest of the banks included in the sample. 
TA is total assets in EUR billions. DLOANS measures the change in total loans in year t as a share of total assets in 
year t-1. LOANS measures total loans as a share of total assets. CAP measures total equity as a share of total assets. 
NONINT measures non-interest income as a share of average total assets. INTINC measures interest income as a 
share of average interest earning assets (i.e. the average of earning assets at the beginning of the year and at the 
year’s end). OPEX measures operating expenses as a share of average total assets. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in a two-sided test of the 
mean with the Bank sample and the DBs sample. 
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Table A.2 – Elections and lending activity: triple interaction term 
Dependent variable: Change in Loans (DLOANS) 
 Whole Sample Smaller DBs' size class Larger DBs' size class 
 (1) (2) (3) 
LTA -3.65*** -4.79*** -4.43*** 
 [0.40] [0.42] [0.86] 
NONINT -0.00 0.01 0.08 
 [0.01] [0.02] [0.13] 
CAP -0.01 -0.01 -0.11* 
 [0.02] [0.03] [0.06] 
    
DGDP * DB -0.46*** -0.40** -0.45*** 
 [0.14] [0.19] [0.17] 
DGDP * DB * FLAWED 0.13 0.04 -0.84* 
 [0.22] [0.23] [0.45] 
    
ELECT * DB -1.08 -0.46 -1.01 
 [0.92] [1.42] [1.33] 
ELECT * DB * FLAWED 3.86* 1.75 9.08** 
 [2.10] [2.33] [4.03] 
Bank fixed effects YES YES YES 
Country-Year effects YES YES YES 
Observations 40,201 29,928 4,650 
N. of countries 27 27 24 
r2 0.27 0.30 0.46 
The regression is run within separate size classes: (i) the whole sample (column 1); (ii) the smaller DB’s 
size class (column 2), which includes banks in the percentiles 22-90 by total assets; (iii) the larger DBs’ 
size class (column 3), which includes banks above the 90th percentile (see Section 3.1 for details). The 
dependent variable DLOANS measures the change in total loans in year t as a share of total assets in year 
t-1. LTA is the logarithm of lagged total assets in EUR thousands. NONINT is the lagged share of non-
interest income over average total assets (i.e. the average of total assets at the beginning of the year and 
at the year’s end). CAP is the lagged share of total equity over total assets. DGDP is the GDP growth rate 
by country and year. ELECT is the share of the year t that falls within the twelve months prior to a 
national election in country c. DB is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for development banks. 
FLAWED is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for “flawed democracies”, i.e. countries that 
in a given year have not the maximum level (10) of constitutional democratic development (DEMOC), 
measured by the Polity IV Project. Then, a significant coefficient on ELECT * DB * FLAWED means 
that ELECT * DB is significantly higher in flawed democracies than in full democracies. The reference 
period is 2002-2015. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A.3 – Elections and lending activity: adopting a weighting strategy 
Dependent variable: Change in Loans (DLOANS) 
 All countries Full democracies (DEMOC = 10) 
Flawed democracies 
(DEMOC < 10) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
LTA -1.68* -1.20 -3.74 
 [0.96] [0.95] [2.34] 
NONINT -0.11 -0.01 -0.22*** 
 [0.08] [0.10] [0.08] 
CAP 0.05 0.04 0.01 
 [0.06] [0.08] [0.12] 
    
DGDP * DB -0.58*** -0.37** -1.32*** 
 [0.19] [0.18] [0.31] 
ELECT * DB  0.37 0.65 4.20*** 
 [1.03] [1.43] [1.19] 
Bank fixed effects YES YES YES 
Country-Year effects YES YES YES 
Observations 40,201 32,880 7,321 
N. of countries 27 17 13 
r2 0.44 0.41 0.53 
In columns 2-3, the sample is split based the level of constitutional democratic development (DEMOC), 
measured by the Polity IV Project on a zero-to-ten scale, with ten indicating “full democracy” and lower 
levels indicating “flawed democracies”. Countries are allowed to move from one group to another 
according to the annual value of DEMOC. All regressions are weighted by the bank’s share of lagged 
total assets in the year. The dependent variable DLOANS measures the change in total loans in year t as 
a share of total assets in year t-1. LTA is the logarithm of lagged total assets in EUR thousands. NONINT 
is the lagged share of non-interest income over average total assets (i.e. the average of total assets at the 
beginning of the year and at the year’s end). CAP is the lagged share of total equity over total assets. 
DGDP is the GDP growth rate by country and year. ELECT is the share of the year t that falls within the 
twelve months prior to a national election in country c. DB is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one for development banks. The reference period is 2002-2015. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A.4 – Elections and lending activity: executive constraints 
Dependent variable: Change in Loans (DLOANS) 
 Full Constraints on Chief Executive 
(XCONST = 7) 
Flawed Constraints on Chief Executive 
(XCONST < 7) 
 Whole 
Sample 
Smaller DBs' 
size class 
Larger DBs' 
size class 
Whole 
Sample 
Smaller DBs' 
size class 
Larger DBs' 
size class 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LTA -4.24*** -5.01*** -4.16*** -2.79*** -4.20*** -5.08*** 
 [0.56] [0.40] [0.93] [0.58] [1.19] [1.52] 
NONINT -0.00 0.01 0.05 -0.00 0.02 -0.28 
 [0.02] [0.01] [0.11] [0.01] [0.03] [0.26] 
CAP -0.04 -0.03 -0.08 0.02 0.03 0.02 
 [0.03] [0.04] [0.06] [0.03] [0.06] [0.13] 
       
DGDP * DB -0.47*** -0.45*** -0.41*** -0.10 -0.24 -1.29*** 
 [0.12] [0.18] [0.15] [0.23] [0.17] [0.46] 
ELECT * DB -0.66 -0.20 -0.61 1.10 1.67 4.56* 
 [0.85] [1.26] [1.30] [1.56] [2.18] [2.47] 
Bank f.e. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-year f.e. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 33,916 27,337 3,718 6,285 2,591 932 
N. of countries 23 23 20 6 6 6 
r2 0.26 0.28 0.41 0.28 0.35 0.62 
The sample is split based the level of Constraints on Chief Executive (XCONST), measured by the Polity 
IV Project on a zero-to-ten scale, with seven indicating “full constraints” and lower levels indicating 
“flawed constraints”. Countries are allowed to move from one group to another according to the annual 
value of XCONST. The regression is run within separate size classes: (i) the whole sample (columns 1 
and 4); (ii) the smaller DB’s size class (columns 2 and 5), which includes banks in the percentiles 22-90 
by total assets; (iii) the larger DBs’ size class (columns 3 and 6), which includes banks above the 90th 
percentile (see Section 3.1 for details). The dependent variable DLOANS measures the change in total 
loans in year t as a share of total assets in year t-1. LTA is the logarithm of lagged total assets in EUR 
thousands. NONINT is the lagged share of non-interest income over average total assets (i.e. the average 
of total assets at the beginning of the year and at the year’s end). CAP is the lagged share of total equity 
over total assets. DGDP is the GDP growth rate by country and year. ELECT is the share of the year t 
that falls within the twelve months prior to a national election in country c. DB is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one for development banks. The reference period is 2002-2015. Robust standard errors 
in brackets. 
Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A.5 – Elections and lending activity: geographical division 
Dependent variable: Change in Loans (DLOANS) 
 Western Europe Eastern Europe 
 Whole 
Sample 
Smaller DBs' 
size class 
Larger DBs' 
size class 
Whole 
Sample 
Smaller DBs' 
size class 
Larger DBs' 
size class 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LTA -3.92*** -4.86*** -3.86*** -3.35*** -4.64*** -8.30*** 
 [0.55] [0.40] [0.86] [0.58] [1.04] [2.50] 
NONINT 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.29 
 [0.02] [0.01] [0.12] [0.01] [0.03] [0.35] 
CAP -0.04 -0.05 -0.09 0.01 0.06 -0.20 
 [0.03] [0.04] [0.06] [0.03] [0.05] [0.24] 
       
DGDP * DB -0.45*** -0.33 -0.57*** -0.37** -0.40*** -1.06** 
 [0.15] [0.23] [0.15] [0.16] [0.15] [0.52] 
ELECT * DB -2.20** -2.06 -2.20** 4.77*** 3.44** 9.09** 
 [0.89] [1.46] [0.99] [1.59] [1.49] [3.55] 
Bank f.e. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-year f.e. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 33,787 26,855 4,073 6,414 3,073 577 
N. of countries 13 13 13 14 14 11 
r2 0.24 0.25 0.31 0.30 0.37 0.71 
The sample is split based the geographical divide between Western Europe and Central-Eastern Europe. 
The regression is run within separate size classes: (i) the whole sample (columns 1-3); (ii) the smaller 
DB’s size class (columns 4-6), which includes banks in the percentiles 22-90 by total assets; (iii) the 
larger DBs’ size class (columns 7-9), which includes banks above the 90th percentile (see Section 3.1 
for details). The dependent variable DLOANS measures the change in total loans in year t as a share of 
total assets in year t-1. LTA is the logarithm of lagged total assets in EUR thousands. NONINT is the 
lagged share of non-interest income over average total assets (i.e. the average of total assets at the 
beginning of the year and at the year’s end). CAP is the lagged share of total equity over total assets. 
DGDP is the GDP growth rate by country and year. ELECT is the share of the year t that falls within the 
twelve months prior to a national election in country c. DB is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one for development banks. The reference period is 2002-2015. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
